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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper assesses the determinants of corruption-control with freedom dynamics 
(economic, political, press and trade), government quality and a plethora of socio-economic 
factors in 46 African countries using updated data. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – A quantile regression approach is employed while controlling 
for the unobserved heterogeneity. Principal component analysis is also used to reduce the 
dimensions of highly correlated variables.  
 
Findings – With the legal origin fundamental characteristic, the following findings have been 
established.  (1) While political freedom increases corruption-control (CC) in a bottom quantile 
of English common law countries, there is no such evidence in their French civil law 
counterparts. (2) Government quality consistently improves CC across all quantiles in English 
common law countries but fails to exert the same effect in middle quantiles of French civil law 
countries.  (3) Economic freedom ameliorates CC only in common law countries with low 
existing CC levels (bottom quantiles).  (4) We find no significant evidence of a positive ‘press 
freedom’-CC nexus and having the status of Low income English common law (French civil 
law) countries decreases (increases) CC. 
From a religious domination scenario, we also find the following.  (1) Political and trade 
freedoms only reduce CC in Christian dominated countries while press freedom has a mitigation 
effect in both religious cultures (though more consistent across quantiles of Christian-oriented 
countries). (2) Government quality is more pro-CC in Christian than in Muslim-dominated 
countries. (3) While economic freedom has a scanty negative nexus with CC in Christian-
oriented countries, the effect is positive in their Muslim-dominated counterparts. (4) Having a 
low-income status in countries with Christian common law tradition improves CC.  
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Originality/value – We complement the literature on the fight against corruption in Africa by 
employing recently documented additional factors that should be considered in corruption 
studies.  
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1. Introduction 
Corruption remains one of the most daunting institutional challenges for majority of 
African countries. As supported by several studies and surveys, it is a major impediment to 
economic progress, social welfare, service delivery and good governance in the continent. In 
accordance with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2009, p.1), it is 
estimated that in 2004, the continent lost more than $148 billion to corruption; approximately 
25% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). More so, the African Development Bank (AfDB, 
2006, p.7) suggests that 50% of tax revenues and $30 billion in aid for Africa, ends up in corrupt 
pockets. In line with the UNECA (2005), corruption is ranked as one of the three most serious 
national problems confronting African countries, the other two being unemployment and 
poverty.  
Many African countries have enacted laws, adopted policy measures and established 
institutions in attempts to address the concern. Still corruption continues to be a lingering issue 
in governance and economic life. Though some consensus is gradually emerging on the 
determinants of corruption across countries, a number of aspects remain unsolved. Today 
policies for the fight against the scourge embraced by national governments and international 
organizations happen to be similar across countries. Yet the effectiveness of some of these 
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measures remains ambiguous (Billger & Goel, 2009), especially the effect of foreign aid on 
corruption. 
The debate by Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a, 2013a) on ‘the effect of 
foreign aid on corruption’ has had an important influence in policy and academic circles. 
Accordingly, the debate can be highlighted in two main strands. In the first, Okada and Samreth 
(O & S) have investigated the nexus between corruption and foreign aid in 120 developing 
countries for the period 1995-2009 and concluded that aid generally reduces corruption and its 
reduction effect is greater in less corrupt countries. As a direct response, Asongu (2012a) has 
partially not subscribed to their criticism of the mainstream approach to the aid-development 
nexus. Using data from 52 African countries for the period 1996-2010, he has found that 
development assistance fuels (mitigates) corruption (the control of corruption) in the African 
continent. Hence, has concluded that the findings of O & S for developing countries may not be 
relevant for Africa.  
In the second strand, some scholars have informally criticized Asongu (2012a) for not 
taking into account the conditional dimension of the O & S conclusion (“…reduces corruption 
especially and its reduction effect is greater in less corrupt countries” p.1). In response Asongu 
(2013a) has extended the debate by: not partially negating the methodological underpinnings of 
O & S and; broadening the horizon of inquiry from corruption to eight institutional quality 
dynamics (corruption, voice & accountability, political stability, corruption-control, rule of law, 
regulation quality, democracy and, government effectiveness). Core to this extension is a 
hypothetical contingency of the ‘institutional perils of foreign aid’ on existing institutional 
quality such that, the institutional downside of foreign aid maybe questionable when greater 
domestic institutional development has taken place. With the hypothesis of institutional 
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thresholds of foreign aid effectiveness fully integrated into the debate, the negative effect of 
development assistance on institutional quality is broadly confirmed in 53 African countries for 
the period 1996-2010 (Asongu, 2013a, p. 1). While the first and second strands have recently 
been reconciled by Asongu & Jellal (2013)
2
, the present study aims to extend the debate by 
taking into account cultural settings.  
In the present paper we attempt to explain determinants in the fight against corruption 
under different cultural scenarios. Its contribution to existing literature is fivefold. Firstly, by 
focusing on the distribution of the dependent variable, we examine if corrupt and ‘clean’ nations 
respond differently to factors that deter corrupt activity. Contrary to mainstream literature, we 
are able to provide an assessment of corruption-control contingent on the distribution of 
corruption-control.  Secondly, the use of much recent data (2002-2010) based on majority (46) of 
African countries provides findings with inclusive and updated policy implications. Thirdly, 
disaggregation of the dataset into four homogenous panels, reflecting legal-origins (Common-
law and Civil-law) and religious-influences (Christianity and Islam) could provide more targeted 
policy implications. Though studies have focused on legal and cultural determinants of 
corruption (La Porta et al., 1999; Asongu, 2013a,b,c), to the best of our knowledge this is the 
first paper that examines these determinants when existing corruption levels matter in a dynamic 
cultural setting.  Thus, by examining the determinants of corruption-control throughout the 
conditional distribution with particular emphasis on the best and worst fighters of corruption, 
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 “The debate by Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) on ‘the effect of foreign aid on 
corruption' in its current state has the shortcoming of modeling corruption as a direct effect of development 
assistance. This note extends the debate by assessing the channels of foreign aid to corruption in 53 African 
countries for the period 1996-2010. Two main findings are established to unite the two streams of the debate. (1) 
Foreign aid channeled through government's consumption expenditure increases corruption. (2) Development 
assistance channeled via private investment and tax effort decreases corruption. It follows that foreign aid that is 
targeted towards reducing corruption should be channeled via private investment and tax effort, not through 
government expenditure. Our results integrate an indirect component and reconcile the debate by showing that, the 
effect could either be positive or negative depending on the transmission channel” (p. 1).  
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policy measures could focus beyond legal-origins and religious-influences if determinants of 
corruption-control differ across the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption.  
Fourthly, we complement Asongu (2013a,b,c) on the dynamics of fighting African corruption 
from a cultural standpoint. Fifthly, while Treisman (2000) and others have focused on a limited 
set of variables, more recent studies have shown that additional factors should be considered for 
corruption studies, especially freedom qualities (Saha et al., 2009
3
; Peyton & Belasen, 2012
4
). 
Hence, by using four freedom channels (economic, political, trade and press freedoms), we 
complement this recent strand (exclusively from an African standpoint) with the first-four 
contributions highlighted above.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the data and presents 
the methodology. The empirical analysis is covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methodology  
2.1 Data 
We assess a panel of 46 countries with updated data (2002-2010) from the African 
Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB), Freedom House and Gwartney et al. 
(2011). Limitation to this time span has a twofold justification: the quest to obtain results with 
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 “This paper examines the effects of economic freedom, democracy and its interaction term on controlling 
corruption. The results indicate that interaction between economic freedom and democracy has a significant impact 
on combating corruption.  Partial effect analysis shows that economic freedom reduces corruption in any political 
environment, and the effect is substantially greater with a higher-level of democracy. In contrast democracy 
increases corruption when the level of economic liberalization is low, however, once past the threshold level 
corruption is substantially lower with full economic freedom” (Saha et al., 2009, p.1).  
4
 “Corruption has affected systems of governance for thousands of years. Existing evidence suggests that it is 
especially common in "emerging and developing economies," yet cross-country analysis in this context is rare. We 
examine the impact of political, economic and media freedom on corruption in a large sample of countries across 
multiple time periods to investigate the marginal differences within each. The results show that increased economic 
and press freedoms are associated with lower levels of corruption in developing countries. We find that although 
increased political freedom through democratization is statistically significant, it reduces corruption only in 
developed countries and may increase levels of corruption in developing countries” (Peyton & Belasen, 2012, p. 1). 
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more updated policy implications and; constraints in data availability for economic freedom and 
freedom to trade.  
The endogenous variable is the ‘control of corruption’ indicator; in line with the 
corruption literature (Billger & Goel, 2009; Asongu, 2012a; Asongu, 2013a,b,c). Consistent with 
recent findings (Saha et al., 2009; Peyton & Belasen, 2012), we explain corruption-control using 
five main independent variables of interest: economic freedom, trade freedom, press freedom, 
political freedom and government quality.  The first two source from the Gwartney et al. (2011) 
economic freedom dataset. Press freedom quality is obtained from Freedom House while, the last 
two are obtained from the ADI of the WB.  
Seven control variables are used: level of economic prosperity, population growth, 
government expenditure, financial globalization, human development, development assistance 
and low-income countries.  These measures have been used collectively or separately in a 
significant bulk of the corruption literature (Bardhan, 1997; Saha et al., 2009; Treisman, 2000; 
Billger & Goel, 2009; Peyton & Belasen, 2012; Asongu, 2013a,b,c). Given the cultural dynamic 
setting of the analysis, the expected signs of the control variables may not be homogenous. 
However, population growth should decrease corruption-control (Asongu, 2013a), government 
expenditure may either be a mitigating or fueling factor depending on the state of institutions, 
financial globalization and human development generally increases the phenomenon (Lalountas 
et al., 2011; Asongu, 2013d) and, contrary to  Okada & Samreth (2012) there is a negative 
‘foreign-aid’-‘corruption-control’ nexus in Africa (Asongu, 2012a). Consistent with recent 
evidence on wealth-dynamics in the African corruption-control literature, we also control for the 
unobserved heterogeneity with low-income countries (Asongu, 2013cd). Selection of these low-
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income countries is in accordance with the Financial Development and Structure Database 
(FDSD) of the WB (countries with a Gross National Product per capita of less than $786).  
To allow for more options in policy implications, the dataset is disaggregated into legal-
origins (English common-law and French civil-law) and religious-influences (Christianity and 
Islam). Firstly, the premise of legal origin (with the edge of English common-law countries) as a 
fundamental cultural characteristic in the fight against corruption (documented by La Porta et al. 
(1998)) has been substantially confirmed in recent African piracy literature (Asongu, 2012bc). 
Accordingly, the underlying logic of informal norms, formal rules and enforcement 
characteristics affect the fight against corruption. Secondly, from intuition religious institutions 
play a significant role in the fight against corruption due to their orientation towards morally 
sound citizens. Beside the particularity of religious institutions on ethical related issues, 
Christianity and Islam significantly differ in the perception of punishments related to corruption. 
The choice of the legal origin is based on La Porta  et al. (2008, p. 289), while religious 
domination is consistent with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 2011) World Fact book. 
The summary statistics (with presentation of countries), correlation analysis (showing the 
nexuses between key variables used in the paper), and variable definitions are presented in the 
appendices. The ‘summary statistics’ (Appendix 1) of the variables used in the panel regressions 
shows that, there is quite some variation in the data utilized so that one should be confident that 
reasonable estimated nexuses should emerge (Panel A). Panel B of the summary statistics shows 
the countries employed in the study. The purpose of the correlation matrix (Appendix 2) is to 
mitigate issues resulting from overparametization and multicolinearity. After a preliminary 
assessment of the correlation coefficients, any serious issues in terms of the relationships to the 
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estimated have been tackled with dual specifications (discussed in Section 2.2 below). Appendix 
3 provides definitions and corresponding sources of the variables.  
 
2.2 Methodology  
Due to the high correlation among various government quality indicators, one might 
criticize the redundancy of some information. Hence, we use principal component analysis 
(PCA) to reduce the dimensions of government-effectiveness, rule of law, regulation quality, 
voice & accountability and political stability. PCA is a widely used statistical technique applied 
to reduce a larger set of correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called 
principal components (PCs) that reflect most of the information in the original data set. In the 
selection of the PCs, the criteria applied to determine how many common factors to retain are 
consistent with Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002). Hence, only PCs with an eigenvalue greater 
than one are retained. As shown in Table 1 below, the first PC is appropriate since it has an 
eigenvalue of 3.971 and represents more than 79% of information in the government quality 
indicators combined. The first PC will subsequently represent the Government Quality (GQ) 
index. 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for a Government Quality (GQ) Index  
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 V & A R.L R.Q G.E PS    
First  P.C 0.419 0.478 0.464 0.467 0.403 0.794 0.794 3.971 
Second  P.C 0.408 -0.099 0.298 0.164 -0.841 0.091 0.886 0.459 
Third P.C -0.786 0.304 0.198 0.425 -0.264 0.071 0.957 0.358 
P.C: Principal Component. V& A: Voice & Accountability. R.L: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. G.E: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability.  
 
Borrowing from the literature (Billger & Goel, 2009; Asongu, 2013abc), to determine 
whether existing levels of corruption-control affect how various determinants in the battle 
against corruption come into play, we use Quantile Regression (QR). The  th quantile estimator 
of the outcome variable is obtained by solving for the following optimization problem. 
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Where  ∈ ( 0 ,1). Contrary to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) that is founded on minimizing the 
sum of squared residuals, with QR we minimize the weighted sum of absolute deviations. The 
conditional quantile of iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                      (2) 
where unique slope parameters are derived for each  th quantile of interest. For the model in 
Eq. (2) the dependent variable iy  is the corruption-control indicator while ix  contains a constant 
parameter, economic freedom, political freedom, press freedom, trade freedom, per capita GDP 
growth, population growth, government expenditure, foreign direct investment, human 
development, foreign aid and low-income. In comparison to OLS, the QR approach is more 
robust in the presence of outliers when the distribution of the dependent variable is a highly non-
normal pattern (Okada & Samreth, 2012).   
 Owing to issues of overparametization and multicolinearity in the independent variables 
of interest, we are poised to mitigate the concerns by using two specifications. Accordingly from 
experience, if two highly positively correlated variables are employed in the same regression, the 
estimated signs of the variables will be opposite with only one significant. The employment of 
dual specifications to tackle the above issues is consistent with the corruption-control literature 
(Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013abc).  
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3. Empirical results 
3.1 Legal origins: Common-law and Civil-law countries  
The findings presented in Table 2 below entail OLS and QR estimates. OLS estimates 
provide a baseline of mean effects and we compare these to separate quantiles in the conditional 
distributions of the outcome variable. 
Based on the results, the following could be established. (1) While political freedom 
increases corruption-control (CC) in a bottom quantile of English common-law countries, there 
is no such evidence in their French Civil-law counterparts. (2) Government quality consistently 
improves CC across all quantiles in English common-law countries but fails to exert the same 
effect in middle quantiles of French civil-law countries.  (3) Economic freedom ameliorates CC 
only in common-law countries with low existing CC levels (bottom quantiles).  (4) From an OLS 
perspective (Specification 2), trade freedom mitigates the phenomenon in both legal cultures, but 
the positive nexus is further significant only in middle quantiles of French civil-law countries. 
(5) We find no significant evidence of a positive ‘press freedom’-CC nexus. (6) Being a low-
income English-common law (French civil-law) country decreases (increases) CC.  (7) Most of 
the significant control variable have the right signs: government expenditures has a positive 
effect (an indication of the quality of existing institutions); foreign-aid generally has a perilous 
impact; positive demographic change could be tackled with additional measures to combating 
lobbying (and rent seeking) and; the negative incidence of human development is due to the 
weight of its per capita income component
5
.  
                         
5
Per capita income prosperity already negatively affects corruption-control (though insignificantly). The educational 
and life expectancy components of human development should intuitively have a positive effect on human 
development. Firstly, citizens with higher levels of education are more informed the on consequences of corruption 
as well as other channels of reaching the same end without necessarily resorting to corrupt means. Education also 
enables citizens to be better informed on their right to demand checks and balances from officials.  Secondly, as life 
expectancy increases, citizens would be less motivated to engage in corrupt activities because of the fore-knowledge 
that, they would potentially spend more time in jail during their life-time if caught and convicted.  
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Table 2: Determinants of Corruption-Control in a legal-origin setting  
             
 English Common Law Countries French Civil Law Countries 
   
 Specification 1 Specification 1 
 OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
Constant  -1.50** -0.30 -2.5*** -2.02** -0.69 -1.79 -0.68 0.008 -0.54 -0.55 -0.46 -0.215 
 (0.031) (0.880) (0.007) (0.049) (0.680) (0.146) (0.229) (0.990) (0.597) (0.428) (0.624) (0.835) 
PolFree 0.022 -0.01 0.08** 0.048 -0.005 -0.000 0.008 -0.015 0.006 0.015 0.013 -0.005 
 (0.402) (0.825) (0.024) (0.199) (0.880) (0.987) (0.568) (0.564) (0.871) (0.683) (0.470) (0.735) 
GQIndex 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.23** 0.15** 0.20*** 0.16** 0.135 0.169 0.22*** 0.31*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.038) (0.000) (0.025) (0.134) (0.194) (0.002) (0.000) 
GDPpcg -0.017 0.006 0.001 -0.01 -0.01 0.013 -0.009 -0.014 -0.014 -0.005 -0.011 -0.01 
 (0.139) (0.841) (0.940) (0.460) (0.573) (0.423) (0.324) (0.716) (0.790) (0.815) (0.300) (0.347) 
Popg 0.53*** -0.04 0.89*** 0.66*** 0.347 0.46** -0.3*** -0.4*** -0.37** -0.293 -0.266 -0.192 
 (0.000) (0.950) (0.004) (0.004) (0.150) (0.035) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.258) (0.202) (0.408) 
TradeFree 0.067 -0.007 0.073 0.095 0.021 0.211 0.12** -0.038 0.036 0.068 0.095 0.069 
 (0.420) (0.954) (0.467) (0.445) (0.944) (0.356) (0.042) (0.796) (0.855) (0.451) (0.248) (0.341) 
Gov.Exp. 0.012*** -0.0004 0.01** 0.01*** 0.009* 0.01** 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.006 0.008* 
 (0.005) (0.969) (0.042) (0.003) (0.077) (0.047) (0.560) (0.804) (0.904) (0.997) (0.169) (0.056) 
FDI 0.016 0.025 0.014 0.013 0.005 -0.01 -0.04*** 0.001 -0.012 -0.03** -0.036 -0.034 
 (0.199) (0.220) (0.499) (0.458) (0.836) (0.494) (0.001) (0.922) (0.549) (0.042) (0.233) (0.264) 
IHDI -0.007* 0.003 -0.007* -0.009** -0.009 -0.01** 0.102 0.421 0.673 0.335 0.016 -0.290 
 (0.058) (0.734) (0.061) (0.034) (0.140) (0.008) (0.853) (0.706) (0.641) (0.664) (0.989) (0.836) 
NODA -0.009 -0.011 0.003 -0.005 -0.015 -0.014 -0.001 0.006 0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.01 
 (0.344) (0.545) (0.794) (0.581) (0.231) (0.264) (0.800) (0.621) (0.772) (0.977) (0.715) (0.267) 
Low-Income -1.48*** -0.447 -1.9*** -1.6*** -1.17** -1.6*** 0.28*** 0.373 0.276 0.29** 0.35*** 0.40*** 
 (0.000) (0.718) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.005) (0.181) (0.455) (0.048) (0.003) (0.000) 
             
Adjusted R² 0.974 0.756 0.768 0.835 0.825 0.823 0.749 0.583 0.535 0.502 0.543 0.554 
Fisher  124.5*** --- --- --- --- --- 22.2*** --- --- --- --- --- 
Quasi-LR --- 97.0*** 177*** 291*** 239*** 158*** --- 111*** 114*** 104*** 110*** 92.01*** 
             
 Specification 2 Specification 2 
 OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
Constant  -3.5*** -4.5*** -3.76 -3.9*** -1.90 -0.25 -3.95** -3.68 -4.68 -1.59 -2.56 -4.16 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.126) (0.000) (0.434) (0.943) (0.045) (0.466) (0.302) (0.628) (0.219) (0.171) 
EconFree 0.290* 0.49** 0.489* 0.358 -0.108 -0.25 0.072 0.047 -0.21 -0.307 -0.04 0.376 
 (0.058) (0.036) (0.057) (0.108) (0.691) (0.451) (0.803) (0.940) (0.715) (0.580) (0.891) (0.493) 
PressFree -0.002 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 -0.008 -0.005 -0.003 0.012 0.010 -0.000 -0.01 -0.006 
 (0.736) (0.665) (0.994) (0.858) (0.466) (0.710) (0.480) (0.259) (0.339) (0.987) (0.118) (0.469) 
GDPpcg -0.019 0.013 -0.019 -0.039 0.011 0.012 -0.006 -0.027 -0.01 -0.021 0.005 -0.01 
 (0.323) (0.655) (0.567) (0.113) (0.755) (0.794) (0.666) (0.740) (0.879) (0.697) (0.756) (0.474) 
Popg 0.64*** 0.391 0.399 0.65*** 0.66** 0.466 0.358 0.507 0.793* 0.247 0.375 0.754 
 (0.000) (0.155) (0.393) (0.000) (0.016) (0.285) (0.144) (0.313) (0.084) (0.497) (0.362) (0.520) 
TradeFree 0.215* 0.099 0.038 0.210 0.422 0.365 0.37*** 0.165 0.32*** 0.34** 0.212 0.180 
 (0.085) (0.576) (0.758) (0.217) (0.178) (0.379) (0.000) (0.414) (0.007) (0.026) (0.314) (0.576) 
Gov.Exp. 0.02*** 0.016* 0.014 0.02*** 0.018* 0.015 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.009 
 (0.001) (0.078) (0.150) (0.000) (0.099) (0.431) (0.594) (0.940) (0.679) (0.774) (0.403) (0.130) 
FDI -0.002 -0.003 0.004 -0.017 -0.002 -0.001 -0.07** -0.047 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.072 
 (0.894) (0.867) (0.822) (0.427) (0.952) (0.981) (0.030) (0.304) (0.651) (0.552) (0.212) (0.211) 
IHDI -0.01*** -0.002 -0.005 -0.01** -0.02** -0.01* -0.475 -1.72 0.766 -0.57 1.942 -2.53 
 (0.008) (0.690) (0.446) (0.013) (0.016) (0.071) (0.737) (0.406) (0.717) (0.814) (1.942) (0.572) 
NODA -0.019* 0.0005 -0.000 -0.008 -0.03* -0.023 0.017 0.030 0.029 0.019 0.005 0.020 
 (0.060) (0.973) (0.944) (0.483) (0.069) (0.311) (0.100) (0.162) (0.115) (0.222) (0.713) (0.271) 
Low-Income -2.26*** -2.0*** -1.941 -2.4*** -2.1*** -2.0*** 0.149 0.126 0.008 0.220 0.194 -0.04 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.127) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.339) (0.704) (0.974) (0.407) (0.242) (0.916) 
             
Adjusted R² 0.941 0.696 0.713 0.788 0.779 0.793 0.545 0.361 0.360 0.252 0.376 0.437 
Fisher  62.2*** --- --- --- --- --- 6.27*** --- --- --- --- --- 
Quasi-LR --- 63.6*** 132*** 234*** 166*** 101*** --- 25.3*** 41.9*** 31.3*** 41.6*** 33.9*** 
             
Notes.  Dependent variable is the Control of Corruption index.  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles 
(e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where the Control of Corruption is least. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares.  PolFree: Political Freedom. GQIndex: Government 
Quality Index. EconFree: Economic Freedom. PressFree: Press Freedom. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Popg: Population growth. TradeFree: Trade 
Freedom. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. IHDI: Inequality adjusted 
Human Development Index. Low-Income: Low Income Countries. P values in brackets. LR: Likelihood Ratio test.  
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3.2 Religious-influences: Christian and Islamic countries  
The findings presented in Table 3 below entail OLS and QR estimates. OLS estimates 
provide a baseline of mean effects and we compare them to separate quantiles in the conditional 
distributions of the outcome variable. 
Table 3: Determinants of Corruption-Control in a religious-domination setting 
             
 Christian Oriented Countries  Islam Dominated Countries  
   
 Specification 1 Specification 1 
 OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
Constant  0.751 0.433 0.572 1.28** 2.04** 0.416 0.089 -0.096 -0.183 0.188 -0.046 1.30 
 (0.1281) (0.515) (0.433) (0.029) (0.024) (0.854) (0.898) (0.915) (0.850) (0.805) (0.981) (0.679) 
PolFree -0.02* -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.019 0.005 -0.036 -0.037 -0.015 0.003 0.149 
 (0.061) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.827) (0.898) (0.637) (0.641) (0.759) (0.990) (0.628) 
GQIndex 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.39*** 0.351* 0.42*** 0.515 0.497 0.40** 0.493 0.264 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.001) (0.244) (0.403) (0.016) (0.523) (0.719) 
GDPpcg -0.008 0.009 0.014 0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.012 -0.002 -0.017 -0.034 
 (0.369) (0.785) (0.669) (0.805) (0.807) (0.710) (0.644) (0.858) (0.802) (0.923) (0.630) (0.495) 
Popg -0.30*** -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.52*** -0.146 -0.008 0.056 0.025 0.069 -0.039 -0.121 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.003) (0.711) (0.960) (0.916) (0.972) (0.749) (0.971) (0.934) 
TradeFree -0.12** -0.081 -0.098 -0.19** -0.233 -0.077 -0.139 -0.077 -0.063 -0.127 -0.116 -0.533 
 (0.044) (0.288) (0.224) (0.040) (0.170) (0.829) (0.169) (0.622) (0.690) (0.257) (0.458) (0.578) 
Gov.Exp. -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.006 
 (0.378) (0.128) (0.297) (0.701) (0.862) (0.589) (0.133) (0.568) (0.533) (0.316) (0.189) (0.619) 
FDI 0.021 0.020 0.024 0.024* -0.002 -0.014 -0.004 -0.009 -0.010 0.008 0.011 0.009 
 (0.103) (0.324) (0.130) (0.066) (0.924) (0.883) (0.815) (0.713) (0.761) (0.736) (0.870) (0.859) 
IHDI 0.003 0.01*** 0.009** 0.006 -0.003 -0.008 -0.034 -0.735 -0.613 -0.579 -0.042 2.684 
 (0.611) (0.001) (0.011) (0.115) (0.511) (0.637) (0.966) (0.722) (0.812) (0.567) (0.981) (0.555) 
NODA -0.003 -0.01** -0.01* -0.01 -0.009 -0.002 -0.005 -0.022 -0.006 0.002 -0.002 -0.019 
 (0.512) (0.021) (0.088) (0.253) (0.552) (0.929) (0.860) (0.881) (0.974) (0.942) (0.936) (0.735) 
Low-Income 0.215 0.50** 0.386* 0.35** 0.52*** 0.209 0.096 0.188 0.048 -0.278 0.340 0.748 
 (0.197) (0.015) (0.077) (0.020) (0.005) (0.720) (0.723) (0.813) (0.963) (0.370) (0.858) (0.776) 
             
Adjusted R² 0.849 0.607 0.591 0.614 0.663 0.675 0.717 0.535 0.500 0.481 0.393 0.530 
Fisher  46.6*** --- --- --- --- --- 9.39*** --- --- --- --- --- 
Quasi-LR --- 140*** 186*** 229*** 259*** 159*** --- 35.9*** 45.1*** 56.9*** 39.3*** 30.9*** 
             
 Specification 2 Specification 2 
 OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 OLS Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90 
Constant  1.34* 0.163 0.070 1.354 3.9*** 4.6*** 14.38 -1.9** -1.9** 8.865 -2.39** -3.4*** 
 (0.067) (0.815) (0.949) (0.126) (0.000) (0.003) (0.414) (0.014) (0.037) (0.727) (0.012) (0.000) 
EconFree -0.078 0.214 0.141 0.062 -0.8*** -0.38 -0.720 0.23* 0.31** 0.187 0.5*** 0.69*** 
 (0.587) (0.102) (0.368) (0.665) (0.000) (0.413) (0.706) (0.051) (0.022) (0.954) (0.000) (0.000) 
PressFree -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.032 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.024 -0.008* -0.017 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.604) (0.001) (0.001) (0.759) (0.068) (0.185) 
GDPpcg 0.016 0.031 0.017 0.030 0.023 0.023 0.006 0.001 -0.005 0.034 -0.003 -0.011 
 (0.223) (0.358) (0.713) (0.331) (0.158) (0.135) (0.892) (0.851) (0.557) (0.693) (0.688) (0.362) 
Popg -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.36** -0.41*** -0.275 -0.72* 1.936 -0.083 -0.003 1.025 0.136 0.171 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.044) (0.001) (0.251) (0.092) (0.654) (0.514) (0.978) (0.863) (0.419) (0.460) 
TradeFree 0.098 -0.103 0.004 -0.098 0.55* 0.138 -0.912 0.111 0.036 -0.783 -0.081 -0.031 
 (0.442) (0.357) (0.975) (0.459) (0.085) (0.751) (0.453) (0.224) (0.726) (0.596) (0.486) (0.888) 
Gov.Exp. -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.001 0.0004 --- --- -0.002 --- --- 
 (0.534) (0.773) (0.772) (0.929) (0.610) (0.831) (0.966)   (0.889)   
FDI 0.023 0.000 -0.000 0.026 0.039 0.026 0.289 --- --- 0.141 --- --- 
 (0.204) (0.977) (0.983) (0.267) (0.209) (0.472) (0.675)   (0.881)   
IHDI -0.004 0.006 0.002 0.001 -0.01* -0.02*** -18.80 --- --- -14.03 --- --- 
 (0.622) (0.234) (0.777) (0.774) (0.079) (0.004) (0.412)   (0.635)   
NODA -0.014 0.012 0.004 -0.016 -0.02* -0.016 -0.029 --- --- -0.067 --- --- 
 (0.162) (0.481) (0.810) (0.202) (0.086) (0.419) (0.649)   (0.487)   
Low-Income 0.251 0.024 -0.008 0.227 0.103 0.502* -4.306 -0.210 -0.32** -2.965 -0.5*** -0.177 
 (0.124) (0.923) (0.977) (0.174) (0.730) (0.090) (0.492) (0.116) (0.029) (0.724) (0.001) (0.692) 
             
Adjusted R² 0.721 0.482 0.446 0.466 0.513 0.519 0.345 0.502 0.480 -0.227 0.352 0.357 
Fisher  19.9*** --- --- --- --- --- 1.632 --- --- --- --- --- 
Quasi-LR --- 73.5*** 81.5*** 109*** 105*** 91.7*** --- 58.3*** 76.1*** 17.3* 49.9*** 32.8*** 
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Notes.  Dependent variable is the Control of Corruption index.  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) 
signify nations where the Control of Corruption is least. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares.  PolFree: Political Freedom. GQIndex: Government Quality Index. EconFree: 
Economic Freedom. PressFree: Press Freedom. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Popg: Population growth. TradeFree: Trade Freedom. NODA: Net Official 
Development Assistance. Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. IHDI: Inequality adjusted Human Development Index. Low-Income: 
Low Income Countries. P values in brackets. LR: Likelihood Ratio test.  
 
Based on the results, the following could be established. (1) Political and trade freedoms 
only reduce CC in Christian dominated countries while press freedoms has a mitigation effect in 
both religious cultures (though more consistent across quantiles of Christian-oriented countries). 
(2) Government quality is more pro-CC in Christian than in Muslim-dominated countries. (3) 
While economic freedom has a scanty negative nexus with CC (in the 0.75
th
 quantile) in 
Christian-oriented countries, the effect is positive for their Islam-dominated counterparts. 
However this comparison should be treated with caution because, owing to issues with degrees 
of freedom, not all socio-economic indicators of control were used in the latter set of countries. 
(4) Having a low-income status in countries with Christian common-law tradition improves CC. 
(5) Most of the significant control variables have the right signs. Financial globalization (foreign 
aid) improves (mitigates) CC (Lalountas et al., 2011; Asongu, 2013d; Asongu, 2012a).   
The results on the dominance of English common-law and Christian-oriented countries in 
CC are broadly consistent with recent African law-finance (Asongu, 2013ef; Asongu, 2012d, p. 
191) and law-piracy (Asongu, 2012c) literature. Our findings demonstrate that blanket 
corruption-control policies are unlikely to succeed equally across countries with different legal-
traditions, religious-influences and political wills in the fight against corruption. Thus to be 
effective, corruption policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels of corruption-control 
and tailored differently across the  best and worst  corruption-fighting countries especially with 
respect to freedom channels. 
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3.3 Further discussion and policy implications  
 Before we dive into further discussing the results, it is important to recall that this paper 
has provided a fivefold contribution to existing literature already discussed in the introduction. 
Accordingly, two cultural scenarios have been investigated: legal origin and religious-
domination. 
 In the first (legal origin) scenario, the following findings are worth discussing to 
elaborate detail. Firstly, whereas political freedom increases CC in a bottom quantile of English 
common law countries, there is no such evidence in their French civil law counterparts. This 
finding is broadly consistent with the legal origin theory which postulates that English common 
law countries enjoy more freedom than French civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1998), which 
ultimately leads to higher levels of CC (La Porta et al., 1999). This interpretation should be 
treated with caution and not generalized to the entire English common law sample because; the 
appealing effect on CC is only present in a bottom threshold. This implies English common law 
countries with high initial levels of CC may be an exception to the finding. Secondly, the 
explanation above is in accordance with the finding that government quality consistently 
improves CC across all quantiles in English common law countries but fails to exert the same 
incidence in the middle quantiles of their French civil law counterparts. Thirdly, the fact that 
economic freedom improves CC only in English common law countries with low existing CC is 
still consistent with the explanation provided above from La Porta et al (1998, 1999). Fourthly, 
the absence of significant evidence of a positive ‘press freedom’-CC nexus could be explained 
by the low journalistic reporting standards in most of the sampled countries (Ndangam, 2006). 
Accordingly, we even find significant negative relationships between press freedom and CC 
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(Table 3). Hence, policy makers should do more to encourage press reporting that is not 
motivated by unhealthy practices, which ultimately mitigate CC.  
 The second scenario on religious domination has also uncovered interesting findings that 
are worth elucidating. Firstly, the fact that press freedom has a mitigating effect on CC in both 
religious cultures is consistent with the explanation provided in the preceding paragraph. Hence, 
the same policy implication applies. On the other hand, the tendencies for political freedom to 
reduce CC only in Christian dominated countries could be traceable to the lower degree of ethnic 
fractionalization in Islam dominated countries. Accordingly, rent seeking and lobbying increase 
with ethnic fractionalization (Banerjee & Pande, 2007) especially in Africa (Asongu & Kodila-
Tedika, 2013). Secondly, the fact that government quality is more pro-CC in Christian oriented 
countries could be traceable to the dominance of English common law in the sample. 
Accordingly, the law literature has shown that English common law countries have better 
government quality in terms of CC than their French civil law counterparts (La Porta et al., 
1999).  
 For both cultural scenarios, foreign aid is broadly detrimental to CC. This broadly 
confirms the Asongu (2012a, 2013a) position on ‘the effect of foreign aid on corruption’ in the 
debate with Okada & Samreth (2012).  
 
4. Conclusion  
This paper has assessed the determinants of corruption-control with freedom dynamics 
(economic, political, press and trade), government quality and a plethora of socio-economic 
factors in 46 African countries using updated data. Results from fundamental cultural 
characteristics of legal-origin and religious-domination (which have broadly demonstrated the 
edge of English common-law and Christian-dominated countries) indicate that, blanket 
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corruption-control policies are unlikely to succeed equally across countries with different legal-
traditions, religious-influences and political wills in the fight against corruption. Thus to be 
effective, corruption policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels of corruption-control 
and tailored differently across the  best and worst  corruption-fighting countries especially with 
respect to freedom channels. 
With the legal origin fundamental characteristic, the following findings have been 
established.  (1) While political freedom increases corruption-control (CC) in a bottom quantile 
of English common law countries, there is no such evidence in their French civil law 
counterparts. (2) Government quality consistently improves CC across all quantiles in English 
common law countries but fails to exert the same effect in the middle quantiles of French civil 
law countries.  (3) Economic freedom ameliorates CC only in common law countries with low 
existing CC levels (bottom quantiles).  (4) We find no significant evidence of a positive ‘press 
freedom’-CC nexus and having the status of Low income English common law (French civil 
law) countries decreases (increases) CC. 
From a religious domination scenario, we have also found the following.  (1) Political 
and trade freedoms only reduce CC in Christian dominated countries while press freedom has a 
mitigation effect in both religious cultures (though more consistent across quantiles of Christian-
oriented countries). (2) Government quality is more pro-CC in Christian than in Muslim-
dominated countries. (3) While economic freedom has a scanty negative nexus with CC in 
Christian-oriented countries, the effect is positive in their Muslim-dominated counterparts. 
However this comparison should be treated with caution because, owing to issues with degrees 
of freedom, not all socio-economic indicators of control were used in the latter set of countries. 
(4) Having a low-income status in countries with Christian common law tradition improves CC.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics and Presentation of Countries  
       
Panel A: Summary Statistics  
       
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Obs 
       
Dependent Variable Corruption –Control  -0.612 0.561 -1.694 1.086 414 
       
 
Main Independent 
Variables of Interest  
Political Freedom  2.903 3.896 -8.000 10.000 414 
Government Quality Index -0.000 1.992 -3.915 5.230 414 
Economic Freedom  5.863 0.869 2.390 7.820 282 
Press Freedom  58.509 19.160 17.000 94.000 287 
Trade  Freedom  5.916 0.900 2.401 7.600 280 
       
 
 
 
 
Control  Variables  
 
GDP per capita growth  2.257 4.966 -33.073 34.243 413 
Population growth  2.262 0.815 -0.143 4.477 414 
Inflation  78.656 1263.2 -9.797 24411 374 
Development Assistance (NODA) 11.232 14.267 -0.251 148.30 365 
Government Expenditure  5.156 12.216 -57.815 80.449 239 
Foreign Direct Investment  4.202 5.410 -4.972 46.829 289 
Human Development  0.611 2.553 0.129 45.139 307 
Low Income countries  0.608 0.488 0.000 1.000 414 
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries (46) 
 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania.  
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.  Obs : Observations.  
 
Appendix2: Correlation Analysis  
               
Independent Variables of Interest Control Variables CC  
PoFree GQI EFree PrFree TFree GDP Popg Infl. NODA Gov.E FDI IHDI LowI   
1.000 0.601 0.385 -0.662 0.264 0.092 -0.094 -0.028 -0.014 0.038 -0.0007 0.087 0.032 0.452 PoFree 
 1.000 0.741 -0.817 0.506 0.123 -0.273 -0.103 -0.237 0.020 -0.091 0.123 -0.292 0.849 GQI 
  1.000 -0.569 0.621 0.159 -0.006 -0.235 -0.229 0.028 0.089 0.113 -0.273 0.643 EFree 
   1.000 -0.46 -0.06 0.110 0.114 0.155 0.004 0.149 -0.138 0.139 -0.637 PFree 
    1.000 0.245 0.041 -0.250 -0.268 0.050 0.231 0.116 -0.298 0.404 TFree 
     1.000 0.122 -0.079 -0.039 0.066 0.010 0.011 -0.119 0.006 GDP 
      1.000 -0.170 0.512 -0.026 0.130 -0.074 0.511 -0.292 Popg 
       1.000 -0.001 0.065 0.291 -0.010 0.048 -0.078 Infl. 
        1.000 0.016 0.389 -0.066 0.487 -0.145 NODA 
         1.000 0.122 -0.002 0.031 0.017 Gov.E 
          1.000 -0.034 0.119 -0.047 FDI 
           1.000 -0.108 0.117 IHDI 
            1.000 -0.259 LowI 
             1.000 CC 
               
PoFree: Political Freedom. GQI: Government Quality Index. EFree: Economic Freedom. PrFree: Press Freedom. TFree: Trade Freedom. GDP: 
GDP per capita growth. Popg: Population growth. Infl: Inflation. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. Gov.E: Government  
Expenditure. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. IHDI: Inequality adjusted Human Development Index. LowI: Low Income countries. CC: 
Corruption-Control.  
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions 
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
    
Dependent Variable 
    
 
Corruption-Control 
 
CC 
Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests. 
 
ADI (World Bank) 
    
Main Independent Variables  
    
Political Freedom   PoFree Democracy index: the form of government in which all 
eligible citizens have an equal say in the decisions that affect 
their lives. 
ADI (World Bank) 
    
Government Quality Index GQI 1
st
 Principal Component of: RL; RQ;V&A; PS; GE PCA 
    
Press Freedom   PrFree The right to publish newspapers, magazines and other 
printed matter without government restriction and subject 
only to the laws of libel, obscenity, sedition..etc 
     Freedom House 
    
 
Trade Freedom  
 
TFree 
Freedom of Trade Index. ‘Freedom to trade internationally’ 
is an index representing: taxes on international trade 
(international trade tax revenues as % of trade sector; mean 
tariff rate and standard deviation of tariff rates); regulatory 
trade barriers (non tariff trade barriers and compliance cost 
of exporting and importing); size of trade sector relative to 
expected; black market exchange rates and international 
market capital controls (‘foreign ownership /investment’ 
restrictions and capital controls). 
 
 
 
 
Gwartney et al. (2011)  
Economic Freedom 
Dataset 
   
 
Economic Freedom  
 
EFree 
Economic Freedom Index. Economic freedom broadly 
represents: freedom to trade internationally; legal structure 
and security of property rights; access to sound money; size 
of government (expenditures, taxes and enterprises) and; 
regulation of credit, labor and business.  
   
    
Control Variables  
    
Per Capital Economic 
Prosperity  
GDP GDP per capita growth rate (annual %) ADI (World Bank) 
    
Population Growth  Popg Population growth rate (annual %) ADI (World Bank) 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (Annual %) ADI (World Bank) 
    
Development Assistance  NODA Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) ADI (World Bank) 
    
Government Expenditure Gov.E Government Final Expenditure (% of GDP) ADI (World Bank) 
    
Financial  Openness  FDI  Foreign Direct Investment(% of GDP) ADI (World Bank) 
    
Human Development  IHDI Inequality adjusted Human Development Index ADI (World Bank) 
    
Low Income Countries  LowI Countries with a GNP per capita of less than $786 FDSD (World Bank) 
    
Legal origins   English Common Law and French Civil Law Countries  La Porta et al. (2008, p. 
289) 
    
Religious dominations   Christians & Muslims  CIA The WFB(2011) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PC: Principal Component. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: 
Regulation Quality. V& A: Voice & Accountability. PS: Political Stability. GE: Government Effectiveness. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. GNP: Gross National Product. PCA: Principal Component Analysis. CIA: Central Intelligence Agency. WFB: 
World Factbook. 
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